Skip to main content

Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

See other formats


And even then, in spite of it all, the troops of the Polish Home Army
still continued to fight in the rear of the Germans.,while Britain, for reasons
of military expediency, still supplied them with weapons by air. But this
assistance was coming to an end., as it was disclosed in the House of Com-
mons in the December of that year.
On the 24th of November, a change was made in the Polish Govern-
ment. Premier Mikolajczyk resigned from his post. From the time he
had first taken up office, particularly from that moment when the Red
Army entered Poland in the early days of 1944, he had been subjected to
pressure from the British Government, who had continuously urged him
into an immediate acceptance of the Soviet's ultimatum. For the sake
of the c unity of the Allies ' he was importuned to come to an agreement
with the Kremlin, to buy its friendship, * at any cost/ Although Miko-
lajczyk gradually began to give in, and towards the end of his office had,
in fact, in his concessions gone beyond the limits which he was allowed by
the Constitution and the leaders of the Polish Underground, nevertheless,
he was unable to satisfy the Soviets.
During Alikolajczyk's period of office, the next act of this Polish drama
was the Warsaw rising, unsupported by the Allies, the tragedy of sovietisa-
tion once again, with its accompanying campaign of deportation under-
taken by the Russians in the occupied part of Poland, and lastly, the
establishment of the c Lublin Committee.' In view of these facts, opposi-
tion to the policy of further concessions, directed under the c sincere
advice * of the British Government, who, acting as Russia's lever, was
prising away the integrity of the Polish Republic, began to grow amongst
the Polish community.
On November 22, Mikolajczyk, after his meeting with Churchill, and
confronted with the ultimatum which warned him of the dangers of a
further negative and dilatory attitude, asked the representatives of
the four main political parties whether or not they would be willing to go
further in their concessions towards the U.S.S.R. and at the same time
he presented them with a draft of a Note to Moscow which he hoped
would help to solve the protracted dead-lock. He received a definite
c No ' . . . The representatives of the parties declared that the readiness
evinced by the Polish Government to make concessions and come to terms
with Russia had hereto met with no tangible response or encouragement
from Moscow. In their opinion, the U.S.S.R. had already decided to
annex the whole area under dispute, to expel the Poles from it and to
impose a puppet Government on what would be left of Poland. From
this aspect, the political role adopted by Mikolajczyk as Premier was no
longer practical and he resigned.
The reasoning which had led Mikolajczyk to adopt a policy of giving
in more and more to Russia (a policy which met no support even amongst
his own party in Poland) might be described as follows ;
350